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NOTES

WHEN K-9s CAUSE CHAOS-AN
EXAMINATION OF POLICE DOG POLICIES
AND THEIR LIABILITIES
"With a nick, nack, paddy whack, throw your dog a
[suspect].""' Although this nursery rhyme distortion grossly
oversimplifies the law enforcement tactics employed by K-9 division
police officers, nonetheless, the amount of force permissible in a K-9
assisted arrest has come under increasing scrutiny. 2
More
specifically, an intense controversy has arisen over the "seek, find,
and seize the suspect, by biting if necessary" policy; 3 its

D Copyright 1994 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
INICHOLAS TUCKER & ROGER McGOUGH, THE OXFORD BOOK OF RHYMES 123
(1992). It should be noted that the exact quotation, "With a nick, nack paddy whack
throw your dog a bone," relates to the reward and punishment style of training used to
motivate an animal to accomplish a desired goal. Id. The concept of allowing a K-9
police officer to bite a suspect as a reward for finding the suspect is frightening. This
type of conduct was exemplified on a videotape broadcast nationally on the CBS Evening
News in December, 1991. LAPD, Dogs and Videotape; Police Commission Must
Examine Allegations About Police Dog Attacks, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1991, at B6
[hereinafter Dogs and Videotape]. The tape showed a police dog repeatedly biting an
unarmed 14 year old suspect of auto theft, who was hiding under a sofa in a back yard.
A K-9 handler explained on the tape that a "patrol dog's reward is to bite the suspect."
Id. Moreover, on September 20, 1989, Christopher Brizelle, a suspect in a stolen car
case, claims his arresting officer told him, "[y]ou know, we must reward the dog for
finding you." Andrea Ford, Critics Callfor LAPD K-9 Unit Moratorium, L.A. TiMES,
Dec. 24, 1991, at B3. Though convicted of joyriding, he later won a $95,000 award
from the City of Los Angeles in a police misconduct suit. Los Angeles Police Dogs
Routinely Bite Suspects, NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 8, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News
library, Omni file.
2 Sheryl Stolberg, Lawsuit ChargesImproper Use of PoliceDogs; Law Enforcement.:
Rights Group Says Hundreds of People Who Posed No Threat to Officers Have Been
Mauled by LAPD Canines. Most of Those Attacked by Animals are Blacks or Latinos,
Attorneys Assert, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1991, at Bi.
' Under this policy, the K-9 officer's goal is to subdue the suspect by biting his arm

or leg. Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1989).
Should such appendage be inaccessible, the dog is taught to bite any other available area
of the suspect's body. Id. Once bitten, the suspect often tries to release the dog's grip
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constitutionality, purpose and implementation have all been
questioned. 4 This manner of K-9 training is notable for its
"aggressive nature" ' because the dog will attempt to seize a suspect
even if the suspect obeys orders, until the handler rescinds his order. 6
"Thus, injury to the apprehended suspect is often inevitable." 7 Yet,
the "find and bite" policy remains the municipal standard over the
less aggressive "circle and bark"8 policy for many jurisdictions with

in an attempt to escape. Id. However, the dog is trained to maintain its hold until
ordered by the handler to release. Id. The ensuing struggle often causes serious injury
to the suspect from multiple bite wounds. Id. Also, it is not unusual for the suspect to
attempt to swat the dog away or to use a stick or knife against the dog, which provokes
the animal to bite. See Bob Pool, Erko's Bite is Worse Than His Bark; Officer Almost
Always Gets His Suspect, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1985, at B6; Bob Petrie, Police Tip:
Never Punch a K-9," Suspect Learns the Painful Way, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 1993,
at B8.
" Charles Brugnola, a former K-9 unit officer on the Hawthorne, California Police
Department, for instance has stated the bite syndrome is a "very easy trap to fall into"
having only punishment as its purpose. Larry King Live: Police Dogs: Are They Safe?,
CNN television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Omni file
[hereinafter Police Dogs: Are They Safe?]. Similarly, retired Captain Charles Beene,
who was a member of the San Francisco Police Department Canine Unit for eight years,
stated that during that time, he made almost 400 arrests and, "[i]n all that time, the dog
bit one suspect. Eliminating cruel and unnecessary use of police dogs is the only thing
that will save police dog units around the country." Charles Beene, Jaws, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1992, (Magazine), at 6.
5 Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1550.
6 Id.

7 Id. However, the severity of such injury can be diminshed provided the handler
possesses complete control over the K-9. Id. Establishing such control, by using leash
commands (requiring a physical touching or tugging), or oral commands (for those
occasions when a suspect is far in front of the handler), enables the handler to recall or
restrain the dog before any serious injuries occurs. Id. According to Joe Hicks,
spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union, under the "find and bite" policy,
even handlers themselves have been bitten at times. Citizens File Suit Against Police
Use of Dogs, UPI, June 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, News library, Omni file.
' See David Beers, A Biting Controversy; Los Angeles Police Dogs Bite Hundreds
of People Every Year, Many of Them Never Charged With a Crime. Officials Say the
Dogs are Just Doing Their Job. The Victims Say They are Instruments of Terror, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, (Magazine), at 23. Under this policy, the dog's task is complete
upon cornering the suspect, and barking an alarm. Id. The dog is trained to knock
down a fleeing suspect with a quick bite, if necessary, and immediately release. Id.
Holding bites are only permitted if the dog or handler is attacked. See infra notes 10204 and accompanying text.
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a K-9 division.9 In particular, the Los Angeles Police Department
has been the focus of vociferous criticism, stemming from an
unusually high bite-ratio t° especially within its minority
communities. I I These criticisms, coming on the heels of the Rodney
King beating, 12 have spawned a class action which will highlight the
issue of whether a governmental agency can be held liable under 42

9 Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1550.
10

A bite-ratio is defined as the number of bites per number of apprehensions. Id.

Experts indicate that bites should result, on average in less than 30% of all K-9 assisted
apprehensions. Id. Some K-9 divisions require an automatic review should the bite-ratio
exceed 20% to ensure "that misbehaving dogs receive prompt corrective training." Id.
" See Dogs and Videotape, supra note 1, at B6; see also Paul Hoffman, The Feds,
Lies and Videotape.- The Needfor an Effective FederalRole in ControllingPolice Abuse
in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453, 1474 n.77 (1993), in which the author,
the legal director of the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, states:
Another example of the racial dimension of the excessive force
problem within both the L.A. Police Department (LAPD) and the
L.A. Sheriff Department (LASD) is abuse associated with the use of
police canine units. Both the LAPD and the LASD have deployed
canine units aggressively in the minority communities of Los
Angeles. In recent years, hundreds of city and county residents have
been bitten, many suffering severe injuries. Evidence disclosed in
civil rights litigation suggests the large majority of people bitten have
been African-Americans and Latinos.
Id. Recently, the K-9 units of Spokane, Washington and Miami, Florida have also come
under similar scrutiny and criticism. The Spokesman-Review of Spokane reported "more
than 80 criminal suspects have been bitten by police dogs since the K-9 unit was formed
in 1988." Newspaper Seeks Police Dog-Bite Records, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAO.,
Sept. 18, 1993, at 8. Additionally, the Miami Herald reported that K-9s were
disproportionately released on black suspects and with greater regularity than other local
K-9 units: "[B]lacks make up 27% of the city's population and 50% of those arrested
but account for 67% of dog bite victims." Yvette Ousley, Miami K-9 Corps Under Fire,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 22, 1993, at Al.
I,
12Stolberg, supra note 2, at B1; see Sharman Stein & William Recktenwald,
Chicago, L.A. Cops are a World Apart, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 1992, at C5; Tom Blair,
Dots and Doggerel, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 16, 1992, at B1.

282 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
U.S.C. § 198313 for a policy or custom which deprives individual
constitutional rights under color of law.14
This Note focuses on the use of K-9s by law enforcement.
Section I discusses the elements that must be established under § 1983
and other legal standards in order to hold a municipality liable for a
K-9 attack. Section II analyzes the competing rationales for the use
of dogs in law enforcement, examining whether K-9s should be used
as tools or weapons by the police. Section III discusses whether the
use of police dogs to apprehend suspects constitutes excessive force.
More specifically, this section examines the standards used by courts
in determining the reasonableness of K-9 assisted arrests. Section IV
examines the issue of municipalities' and police officers' qualified
immunity in the context of K-9 attacks. This Note concludes that, in
order to protect civil rights and to avoid liability, municipalities must
implement the less violent "circle and bark" policy for their K-9
units.
I. Municipal Liability
Illustrative of the scenario in which a municipality is sued for
a K-9 injury is the case of Starstead v. City of Superior.15 In
Starstead, the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
denied a motion to dismiss filed by the City, its mayor and its police
chief for failure to state a claim against them.' 6 The claim alleged
that there was a violation of rights guaranteed under the Fourth

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides that:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
14 Stolberg, supra note 2, at B1.
15533 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
16 Id. at 1373.
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Amendment, 7 among others, 1 8 and under § 1983. t9 These violations
were in connection with intentional attacks by defendants' police dogs
"without reasonable cause for their use '2 0 on five separate occasions,
injuring seven individuals. 2 '
The court's recounting of these K-9 attacks in sequential
fashion has a powerful effect. The first plaintiff, Starstead, was a
passenger in the van his girlfriend was driving, and was attacked by
a K-9 unit after being stopped by a police car, though no traffic
violation ticket was issued.22 He withstood bites to his upper hip and
arm and almost lost his thumb. 23 The second plaintiff, Breezee, was
involved in a car accident and left the scene.24 He then went home
and tried to call the police.2 5 Meanwhile, police officers forcibly
entered his home, handcuffed him, and ordered a K-9 to attack.26
Breezee suffered bites to his left leg.2 7 The third plaintiff, Hill, tried
to evade the defendant officer while dining in a club. 28 However,
when Hill was ordered to come forward, he did so.29 He was

I7 The

Fourth Amendment reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18The complaint also alleged violations under the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, but these allegations were summarily dismissed. Starstead,533 F. Supp.
at 1366.
19 Id.
20

Id.

21 Id.

' Id. The court noted there was no reasonable cause for the defendant to order the
police dog under his command to attack. Id. at 1366.
2'Starstead, 533 F. Supp. at 1366.
24 Id. at 1367. Breezee returned later to the scene to discover the other party had
already left. Id.
2 id.
26 Id. Again, the court noted there was no reasonable cause for the attack order.
Id. at 1367.
27Starstead, 533 F. Supp. at 1367.
2 Id.

29Id.
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"unarmed, made no threatening moves" and, specifically, said that he
was surrendering." Nonetheless, the police dog attacked, and was
ordered to attack again shortly afterwards. 3' Hill suffered bites to his
inner left thigh. 2 The fourth plaintiff, Dolsen, was engaged in the
apparent misdemeanor theft of siphoning gasoline. 3 Without heeding
Dolsen's cry of surrender, and despite his being unarmed, a K-9 was
ordered to attack.34 Only after the dog was physically pulled away
from Dolsen, was it ascertained that he withstood multiple bites to his
left arm and shoulder. 5 The fifth, sixth, and seventh plaintiffs,
Bartsias, Bjork and Orak respectively, were all involved in the same
incident. 6 Police stopped them in a parking lot and a scuffle
ensued. 7 All three were consequently attacked by orders of the
presiding officer38 and suffered multiple dog bite wounds. 9
The Starstead court was quick to point out that under Monell
v. New York City Department of Social Services,4" cities are
"persons" under § 1983,41 and, therefore, can be held liable for their
agents' unconstitutional acts. 42 However, from Moneil it is likewise
clear that a "municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

30

Id.

31 id.
32

Starstead, 533 F. Supp. at 1367.

33id.

id. The court pointed out that because the dog failed to heed oral commands, the
defendant had to forcibly pull the dog off its victim. Id.
35 ld.
6 id. at 1367-68.

37Starstead, 533 F. Supp. at 1367.
38

id.

39Id.

40436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
42 Starstead,533 F. Supp. at 1368; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 701. The Court found
that "Congress, in enacting . . . [the statute] intended to give a broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights." Id. at 685. Thus the Supreme Court
overruled the earlier case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that
Congress had sought to exclude municipalities from § 1983 liability. Id. See generally
Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in
the Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409 (1978) (arguing that Monel corrects the error
of Monroe and convincingly establishes that Congress did-not intend to exclude
municipalities from the scope of § 1983 liability).
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respondeat superior theory. "43 Hence, "a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. "' Consequently, if one
unconstitutional act by a lone municipal employee is alleged, it will
not suffice to infer this particular conduct was followed in order to

execute official policies. 45 Conversely, "where the plaintiff alleges
a pattern or series of incidents of unconstitutional conduct, then the
courts have found an allegation of policy sufficient to withstand a
dismissal motion. "46
It, therefore, follows that a city can only be held liable if the
alleged unconstitutional act was committed due to a "policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers. "47 Furthermore, even if the constitutional
deprivation arose out of a governmental "custom ,"48 without having
been formally approved through the "official decision making
channels,"4 9 municipal liability may still attach. 5"

From this analysis, the Starsteadcourt asserted, "proof of two
elements is necessary to establish municipal liability under § 1983:
Plaintiffs must establish that (1) they have suffered deprivation of
constitutionally or statutorily protected interests; and (2) that the
4' 436 U.S. at 691. This principle, "which in itself means nothing more than look
to the man higher up," postulates that a master is vicariously liable for any and all
tortious conduct of his servant which is "within the scope of employment." Dan Dobbs
et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 69, at 500-02 (5th ed. 1984).
4 Monel, 436 U.S. at 691.
4S Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 649 (7th Cir. 1981). "[Wlhen an
individual offical breaks with official policy, and in doing so violates the constitutional
rights of another, then that official, and not the municipality whose policies he breached,
should be made to bear the liability." Id.
4Id.
at 650.
47 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
' In Monell, the Court pointed out, "Congress included customs and usages [in §
1983] because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials
... . Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could
well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force
of law." Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970)).
49Id. at 691.
SOSee id. at 694. The Court concluded that it is when a custom "[wihether made by
its lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may be fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury- that the government as an entity is reponsible under § 1983."
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deprivation was caused by an official policy. "51 In Starstead, because
the plaintiffs alleged both elements-a constitutional deprivation
suffered through use of unreasonable force, and a "systematic pattern
of misuse of police dogs," 52 their allegations were sufficient to
overcome defendants' motion to dismiss.
The decision in another, more recent case, Kerr v. West Palm
Beach,' was founded on similar principles. The facts in Kerr
involved several specific apprehensions made by the West Palm
Beach Police Department's K-9 unit.55 Suit was brought, not only
against the offending police officers, but also against the City and its
former police chief under § 1983.56 At trial, plaintiffs argued there
was a failure to train on defendants' part.57 Specifically, the plaintiffs

5'533 F. Supp. at 1368.
52 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants City of Superior, Police Chief

Martinson, and Mayor Hagen tacitly encouraged the defendant officers' unconstitutional
behavior and that their insufficient training as well as their supervision of the defendant
officers amounted to "gross negligence" and "deliberate indifference." Id. at 1368-69.
" Id. at 1372.
-4875 F.2d 1546 (lth Cir. 1989).
" Among the bite victims in Kerr were John Terrel, Jimmy Jerome Arnold, and
Uwaine Kerr. Id. at 1548. Terrel, lying drunk in some bushes, was mistaken by police
to be a burglar, dragged out of the bushes by the mouth of a police dog, and suffered
multiple bite wounds. Id. at 1551-52. Arnold pled guilty to stealing fishing equipment,
but not before he was bitten by a disobedient police dog, in the course of arrest. Id. at
1552. The dog had to be hit over the head with a flashlight before releasing Arnold.
Id. Kerr, against whom no charges were filed, tried to evade police once they
discovered him walking through a park at night. Id. Believing he eluded his pursuers,
Kerr stopped to urinate against a building, and was then attacked by a K-9 from behind.
Id.
16 Id. at 1547.
17 Id. at 1550. "Testimony at trial established that in assessing whether to use canine
force, an officer did not need to have probable cause to believe that the suspect
committed a felony; instead a 'reasonable suspicion' was sufficient." Id. Moreover,
undisputed testimony uncovered the existence of an oral policy within the West Palm
Beach Police Department allowing officers to use the canine unit against "fleeing and
concealed individuals suspected of a 'serious misdemeanor."' Id. Rather than defining
this type of crime, it was left to the officers' discretion to determine what was a "serious
misdemeanor." Id. Hence, the scope of this undefined crime was very broad, and
canine force was being used against fleeing or concealed individuals "suspected of
prowling, of drunkenness, of petty larceny, of prostitution, of traffic offenses-even
individuals whose only offense was being in a city park after hours." Id. In fact, it was
within the officer's discretion to use canine force on any suspect who failed to heed an
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alleged that the City and its former police chief inadequately trained
the K-9 division in the extent of force permissible under the
Constitution, and failed to see that misbehaving dogs receive
corrective training.5" The evidence submitted to advance the theory
of inadequate training included the following: (1) more frequent use
of K-9 force relative to other cities with K-9 units; (2) other K-9
units viewed West Palm Beach's high bite-ratio as an indication of
irresponsible use of force; (3) "bite reports" filed by K-9 handlers
were reviewed by supervisory officials, including the police chief, a
policymaking official; and (4) direct evidence that the city was
cognizant of the inadequacies in the K-9 training program and its
supervision.59 A trial on the issue of liability yielded a verdict for the
plaintiffs against the individual officers.6" The jury also found against
the defendant-city and its former police chief,61 who asked the court
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.62 The lower court
granted the defendants' motion.6 3 The Eleventh Circuit reinstated the
jury verdict, concluding that Kerr had mustered sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to find the City of West Palm Beach and its
former police chief liable for its actions.'
In sharp contrast, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana ordered summary judgment against the plaintiff in Banks

order to stop, since failure to obey an officer's command was, in itself, a misdemeanor.
Id.
5' Id. at 1551. The Department maintained no "specialized internal procedures for
monitoring the performance of the canine unit." Id. And though "force reports,"
written documentation describing force used by an officer to apprehend a suspect, were
prepared by the shift commander, the court deemed these reports to be an ineffective
monitoring mechanism. Id.
5' Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1551-56; see Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, & Zinermon:
Official Policy Affirmative Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government
Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 13 n.50 (1990).
' Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1548.
61Id.
62 Id.

6 Id.
' At trial, William M. Barnes, acting chief of the West Palm Beach Police
Department from October, 1984 until March, 1985, admitted that he was notified by the
city manager as well as "'general conversation around" that "[m]aybe we were having too
many bites." Id. at 1557.
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v. Goines. 65 In this case, the plaintiff brought an action for damages
under § 1983 against the City of New Orleans and individual police
officers." The plaintiff alleged that he was bitten by a police dog,6 7
by failing to have any
and "that the City was negligent .
guidelines or standards governing the use of canines during search
and arrest operations, and by failing to provide safeguards against the
exertion of excessive force by the officers. "68 Yet, the court, noting
that the plaintiff failed to attach any exhibits to prove his position,
summarily stated that "the plaintiff has not offered a scintilla of
evidence to support its contention that the procedure for training the
canine animals is insufficient, improper or imprudent in any way. "69
In Kerr, however, the Eleventh Circuit applied the "deliberate
indifference" legal standard7" enunciated in City of Canton v.
Harris.7 This standard necessitates that two related elements be
established in order to hold a municipality liable.72 First, a city must
have, in fact, inadequately trained its employees in the lawful
execution of their duties. 73 Second, this failure to adequately train
must have been the result of an actual city policy. 74 In general, this

6 No. 88-553, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 267 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 1989).
6Id. at

*1.

67 Id.

"Id.
69 Id. at *4.
70 Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1555.
7' 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8 (1989).

In Harris, the Court held that "the inadequacy of
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact." Id. at 388.
72 Id. at 390.
71 d.
7' The Kerr court acknowledged that it may "'seem contrary to common sense"' to

argue that a municipality will actually embrace a policy of inadequate employee training.
875 F.2d at 1555 n.14 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). Yet, if "'the need for
more or different training is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights ... the policy makers of the city can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need."' Id. But see Hoffman, supra note 11,
at 1475 (concluding that "[tihe LAPD's pattern of excessive force was not merely a
collection of isolated or aberrational incidents. Instead, it was attributable to the policies
of the LAPD management, policies supported, at least indirectly, by the city's political
leaders and the voting community." (emphasis added)).
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standard "approaches intentionality and poses significant problems of
proof."" Expounding on the second element, the Kerr court noted
that "only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a
relevant aspect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of
its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a
policy or custom actionable under § 1983. "76 This statement comes
to life in an admission made by Captain Don Burt, overseer of the
Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's K-9 unit.7 7 Burt confessed he
found some supervisors "providing inadequate or no training to
canine handlers" when he first assumed command. 78

Contrary to Burt's admission, Los Angeles Deputy City
Attorney, Mary E. House, emphatically defended the unit claiming
that "[w]e have one of the finest and highly trained canine units in the
United States, . . . [w]e are a model for many jurisdictions . . . in

both ongoing training and certification and the use of dogs in the
field."79 Notwithstanding these conflicting views, the Kerr court
stated that if "the need for more or different training is so obvious.
. . the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to
represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the
city may be held liable if it actually causes injury. "" In Los
Angeles, police dogs have actually caused injury 1035 times during
the period extending from 1988 to 1991.81 Despite House's
downplaying of the severity of the bite statistics by asserting eighty
percent could have been treated by applying a mere Band-Aid, 82 this
large number of bites is significant when compared with the 215 bites

75 David Rudovsky, Note, PoliceAbuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 465, 486 (1992). However, where the causal connection between
training and discipline and the incidence of abuse are well established, the Harrisruling
should prompt further advances toward increased municipal liability. Id.
76 875 F.2d at 1555 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389).
77 Beers, supra note 8, at 23.
' Id. However, since that time, Captain Burt declares that he "beefed up training
and made all the handlers responsible to one person." Id.
79 Victor Merina, Police K-9 Unit in Dog Fight with Critics, Law Enforcement:

Lawsuit Claims Hundreds of People Have Been Needlessly Mauled. LAPD Contends
Most Bites Are Provoked, L.A. TIMEs, July 8, 1991, at B1.
8o 875 F.2d at 1555 n.14 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390).
sI Merina, supra note 79, at BI.
IId.; see Beers, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing abuses by police dogs).
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reported in Washington, D.C.," or the twenty in Philadelphia over
the same period of time.84 Only thirty bites were reported in
Baltimore in 1991," and only one bite was reported in Houston in
1991.86 San Diego's seven year old canine unit has a one in thirty
bite-ratio, which is also relatively low. 87

IL "Findand Bite" Versus "Circle and Bark"
The sizable number of police dog bites reported in Los
Angeles88 underscores the debate over which policy should govern:
the "find and bite" or the "circle and bark. "89 The varying rationales
for these competing policies are rooted in two distinctly different
perceptions as to how K-9s should be, and how they are, used in law

enforcement. Some claim that a dog should be used as a a tool;
others claim that it should be used as a weapon.90 In particular,
Sheriff Ted Sexton of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, argues that "the
primary use of a dog is the dog's nose, whether its to find persons
via a track, find a person in a building ... the main objective of the

83
84

Beers, supra note 8, at 23.
Dogs and Videotape, supra note 1, at B6. However, in 1984, as a result of a

three and one half month investigation, five police dogs were to be permanently retired
from the force, and 12 officers were to be temporarily reassigned within the department.
Around the Nation; Philadelphia Officers in Inquiry on Dog Use, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1984, at A8. The investigation was prompted by reports in the PhiladelphiaInquirer
of a loss of control of police dogs, and ordered attacks on unarmed men and women.
See id.; Taking Huggy Off the Beat, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1984, at 26.
85 Beers, supra note 8, at 23.
86 Id.
87 Blair, supra note 12, at B1.
u See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
89 Id.
' As a tool, the dog can be used to search buildings, track down criminals or lost
persons, detect narcotics or hidden explosives, and for patrol. Robert L. O'block et al.,
The Benefits of Canine Squads, 7 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 155, 157-58 (1978).
Alternatively, the dog can be used as a weapon to defend the handler against attack,
control unruly crowds, and, in general, as a psychological deterrent. Id.
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dog is the nose." 9 This sentiment is echoed by Dave Reaver of the
Alderhorst Police Dog School located in Riverside, California, one
of the biggest private suppliers and trainers of such dogs in the
United States.92 Reaver, speaking from a trainer's point of view,
notes that "[w]e use police dogs for their sense of smell-to find
people and things. The reason the dog is trying to find something is
because he wants to bite it. A good trainer works with this drive,
uses it."93
Similarly, Charles Brugnola, a K-9 officer on
administrative leave from the Hawthorne, California Police
Department, believes that:
A dog is not used-should not be used for a weapon.
It's not a weapon. It is a search tool. The nose on
the dog is the thing that's valuable, and the nose is
used to go out and hunt down the suspect . . . and
this type of thing-has nothing to do with guns."

In support of this view, experts claim that dogs home in on
the scent of "sweat and fear emitted by people who know they are
being chased. '95 In fact, the dog's sense of smell is said to be
100,000 times more sensitive than a human's.9 6 Accordingly, animals

which are part of the K-9 unit are referred to as "search dogs" rather
than "patrol dogs," a term commonly used to characterize their
military counterparts. 97
9' Police Dogs: Are They Safe?, supra note 4. Another advantage that K-9s have
over their human counterparts is speed, which can "top out at 25 miles per hour." Bob
Petrie, A Bite Out of Crime, Chandler Police Dogs Eager to Enter the Chase, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC/PHoENIX GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1994, at 1.
2 Robert Ferrigno, Guard Dogs Muscle in on Hulking Job, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6,

1985, at Cl.
9 Id.
4 Police Dogs: Are They Safe?, supra note 4.

95Pool, supra note 3, at B6.
' O'bloek et al., supra note 90, at 157; see John Holliman, Competitions Show

Usefulness and Safety of Police Dogs, (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1992)
available in LEXIS, News Library, Omni file. See generally Alison Grant, Getting
Dogged Police Work; Bentleyville Puts Czech-Only German Shepherd on Force, PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 28, 1993, at B1 (stating that a police tracking hound's nose is 50 to 100

times keener than a human's).
97 Ford, supra note 1, at B3.
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Alternatively, the views of those who perceive police dogs as
dangerous weapons, and are used more for their mouth than their
nose, are voiced with more force and color. For example, Barry
Litt, a public interest lawyer, declares that dogs are like "a live chain
saw."198 Likewise, in the opinion of Don Cook and Robert Mann,99
lawyers who represent dog bite victims in Los Angeles, "the dogs are
instruments of terror. "10 Considering that the force of a dog bite
impacts with at least 1,200 pounds per square inch, 1" 1 it is not
difficult to understand why the "circle and bark" philosophy is being
advocated. Under the "circle and bark" policy, the K-9's assignment
is completed when it has trapped the suspect and barked an alarm. 102
For a fleeing suspect, the dog is trained to "knock him down with a
quick bite, if necessary, and immediately let go. "13 Holding bites
are permitted only in a case where the dog or his handler is
attacked. "
In one such case, Kopf v. Wing,"0 5 the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment, against appellant's §
1983 claim. 0 6 Although some facts were in dispute, 0 7 the court
narrated the sequence of events in a dramatic fashion. In essence, the
police responded to a report of armed robbery, managed to apprehend
an unarmed perpetrator, and sought to capture two others still at
large, suspecting they were still in possession of a weapon."0 8 A

98Stolberg, supra note 2, at B1.
99Robert Mann represented Mirian C. Rose, the plaintiff in Rose v. City of Los
Angeles, 814 F. Supp. 878 (C.D. Cal. 1993). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her
son, an armed robbery suspect, was mauled by a police dog which severed his femoral
artery. Id. at 879. The suspect was ultimately shot and killed by the arresting officer
in claimed self-defense. Id. The court concluded that the "plaintiff, however, can not
maintain on her own behalf an action for a violation of the decedent's [her son's]
constitutional rights." Id. at 885.
100Beers, supra note 8, at B3.

101Ferrigno, supra note 92, at Cl.
102Beers,

supra note 8, at B3.

103 Id.

id.
105942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1179 (1992).

104

'0/ Id. at 270.
107Id. at 266.
108Id.

1994]

K-9 CHAOS

293

police dog was summoned, and after a disputed shouted warning, a
police officer released the dog in pursuit of the suspects.10 9 When the
officer next saw the dog, he was biting a battling suspect.110 The
officer moved in and a struggle ensued between one of the suspects,
As a result of this
Anthony Casella, the officer, and the K-9.'
'
112
He was hospitalized
struggle, Casella was "frightfully mauled.
thirty-seven days for reconstructive surgery, and for treatment of dog
bites to his upper lip, chest, knee, leg, and scrotum, and other severe
injuries. 13
The Kopf court, in considering the county's liability, held that
although the county's written policies regarding the use of excessive
force were "exemplary, "114 the appellant had cited particular incidents
where such force was used.115 Therefore, though the court felt the
appellant had a marginal case against the county, a case nonetheless
existed.116 As for the liability against individual officers, the court of
appeals looked to the "objective reasonableness" test prescribed in
Graham v. Connor,11 7 to determine whether the arrest was undertaken
with excessive force. 1 Given that a police officer must often make
109 Id.;

see Gregg Henderson, High Court Allows Police Brutality Suit Against

County, UPI, Washington News, Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPI file.
110Kopf, 942 F.2d at 266.

...
Id. at 267.
112 Id.

113Debbie M. Price, P. G. Officer in Brutality Case was Drunk Driver's Nemesis;

DWlArrests Won Him Commendations, WASH. POST, July 16, 1989, at Dl. Casella
later pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to five years in prison. Henderson,
supra note 109. Casella brought the federal civil rights suit on February 21, 1989. Id.
Casella, himself, was killed five months later in a prison fight. Id. However, his
mother, Ada Sandra Kopf has pursued the suit. Id.
114
Kopf, 942 F.2d at 269.
115
Id.
116Id.
117490 U.S. 386 (1989).

According to one commentator, "[plerhaps the most
significant effect of the Court's decision in Graham will be to provide much needed
consistency in analyzing excessive force claims brought by arrestees against police
officers. Those circuits that have applied a substantive due process analysis, considering
subjective motivations, must now turn to a purely objective standard." Jill I. Brown,
Note, Defining "Reasonable" Police Conduct: Graham v Connor and Excessive Force
During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1257, 1269 (1991).
Kopf, 942 F.2d at 267.
...
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split-second decisions, the reasonableness test suggests that the use of
a particular force should be judged from the viewpoint of11a9
reasonable officer at the scene, instead of with "20/20 hindsight.
In terms of sufficient evidence to quash a summary judgment motion,
the Fourth Circuit, unlike the district court, believed that the
appellant had mustered enough proof to permit a fair-minded trier of
fact to conclude that the officer's force was objectively
unreasonable. 2 The court noted several places where the district
court resolved issues of material fact where it should have accepted
appellant's version as the truthful one."' For instance, the court
characterized the officer's shouted warning, heard by other police
officers, but not by civilian witnesses, as a crucial point of
contention, because a forewarning that a dog will attack offers the
suspect an opportunity to surrender, and is more reasonable than a
surprise attack.122 Furthermore, the appellant provided expert
testimony 2 1to support his argument that the use of a police dog in a
case where the suspect is "cornered and escape impossible,"' 24
notwithstanding any opportunity for surrender, is unreasonable. 125 In
addition, the district court found Casella had refused to surrender,
though ordered to do so.' 26 On this point, the court of appeals
poignantly noted that "[w]e believe that a jury could find it
objectively unreasonable to require someone to put his hands up and
calmly surrender while a police dog bites his scrotum.' '1 27 The

"' Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
120
121

Kopf, 942 F.2d at 268.
id.

122Id.
123According

to Thomas Knott, appellant's expert and a retired canine unit trainer

for the Baltimore City police, "the primary purpose of a police dog . . . is to locate
supects, not to bite them." Id.
124id.

'2' Kopf, 942 F.2d at 268. Appellees argued that, because they feared that the
suspect was armed, it was reasonable to send the K-9 in first, rather than subject an
officer to the possibility of getting shot. Id. But see Chew v. Gates, 744 F. Supp. 952,
956 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that even though the suspect was surrounded and escape
was virtually impossible, because the suspect could still have ambushed police officers,
he posed a threat to their safety).
'26Kopf, 942 F.2d at 268.
27 Id. at 268.
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Supreme Court, without comment, later refused to hear an appeal
brought by the county to disallow the suit. 2 '
A K-9 attack victim, similar to the one in Kopf, was sitting in
a park reading a book when a LAPD dog leapt onto him. 29 "I was
fighting for my life," victim Jose Ricardo Rivera said, "[w]hen I
opened my legs to try and kick the dog, that's when he bit my
testicle. "130 No warning was heard and the officers involved admitted
at a deposition that "the dog just got too far out in front."131
Yet, according to Sherif Sexton, not every suspect needs to
be bitten by a police dog in the act of a K-9 assisted arrest. 132 He
claims that "[t]here are ways to train the dog to be able to decide
whether it should [bite] or not. ""', Sergeant Duane Pickel, trainer of

Tallahassee's K-9 teams in the "circle and bark" technique, claims
that the policy has not prevented the unit from making arrests and has
reduced liability suits dramatically.134 Tallahassee's six dog unit has
effected over 200 arrests with only six bites reported.' 35 Moreover,

'2 Prince George County v. Kopf, 112 S. Ct. 1179 (1992).

"9 Beers, supra note 8, at 23.
30 Id. In a similar incident, a 66 year old grandmother filed a claim alleging a
police dog attacked her in her own backyard, as she let out her small dog and checked
to see if any cats were outside. Jim Newton, Grandmother Joins List of Plaintiffs
Alleging Attacks by Police Dogs, L.A. TIMEs, May 20, 1992, at B3. She was bitten on
the upper parts of both legs. Id.
131Id. But see Kenneth Reich, Deputy Asked Him to Lie, Witness Testifies; Suit.: A
Business Man Says in a Deposition that the Officer Requested Him to Go Along with the
Official Version of a Dog Bite Incident but that He Refised to Change His Story, L.A.
TIMES, June25, 1992, at B1 (explaining how a convicted burglar sued the Los Angeles
Sheriffs Department for allowing a police dog to bite him several times after he was
handcuffed). A deputy involved in the case requested a witness to alter his account so
that it corresponded precisely with the official report. Id. According to sworn
testimony, the deputy told the witness that unless he went along with the official version
of the incident the deputy "could lose his job." Id.; see Two Officers Cleared in Dog
Bite Case, L.A. Times, July 9, 1992, at B2 (reporting that two officers were cleared
through an internal investigation of falsifying reports on the arrests of two people bitten
by a police dog); Patrick McCartney, Ventura County News Roundup: Simi Valley; City
Sued Over Use of Police Dog, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at B2 (alleging that officers
lied in explaining injuries received by prisoners and arrestees as a result of police dogs).
132Police Dogs. Are They Safe?, supra note 4.
133 Id.
134 Beers,
'I' Id.

supra note 8, at 23.
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the unit has not been sued in the past twenty years. 136 Furthermore,
Charles Brugnola, formerly of the Hawthorne, California police K-9
unit, compares the "find and bite" policy to a "search and destroy
mission. "137 He believes that handlers encourage biting to punish the
suspect, and, acting on this belief, has trained officers to detach
themselves from the "bite syndrome. "138 He maintains that police
dogs should be used to reduce "man hours to search buildings and for
finding suspects

. . .

not for attacking people. "39

III. Excessive Force
Whichever view is taken, it is irrefutable that a police dog's
jaws can exert an incredible amount of force.14 As an illustration,
of the three most popular breeds of dog used in police work, the
German Shepherd and Doberman Pinscher boast a jaw grip strength
of 1,200 to 1,500 pounds per square inch of force. 14 ' The
Rottweilers' jaws can summon 2,000 pounds per square inch of
force. 1 2 Moreover, the hefty 110 pound Rottweiler can overmatch
a suspect just by using body weight alone. 143 Hence, some believe
that the police dog's greatest service is as a deterrent;' 44 "[t]heir mere
presence on the street, even the knowledge that they may be lurking

136

Id.

Police Dogs: Are They Safe?, supra note 4.
138Id. Brugnola described this syndrome as police officers allowing and actually
'3

encouraging their dogs to bite suspects or alleged suspect. ld.
139Id.
140See Ferrigno, supra note 92, at Cl.
141Id. "German shepherds are considered the best all-around protection dog,
preferred by the military and civilian police departments around the world." Id.
Dobermans, on the other hand, "are a recently created breed (late 1800s), a 'man made'
dog designed for strength and agility . . .developed in Germany-a combination of
Rottweiler, black-and-tan hound, and Manchester terrier-for use as bouncers in rowdy
German bars." Id. "Dobermans are one of the most intelligent of all animals." O'block
et al., supra note 90, at 159.
142 See Ferrigno, supra note 92, at Cl.
143Id. "Rottweilers are the linebackers of the dog world. They're big, strong and
stubborn, real bruisers who love the sensation of slamming meat against meat." Id.
14 See O'block et al., supra note 90, at 157.
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near, exerts a powerful restraint upon lawbreakers." 145 This view is
corroborated by Brugnola's estimation that in his six year career,
ninety percent of the suspects he encountered surrendered willingly
the moment they discovered he had a K-9.141
However, it is the police dogs' propensity to react with
immense force that forms the central issue of excessive force that
courts must grapple with when determining what amount of force is
constitutionally permissible. In Robinette v. Barnes,147 the force used
to apprehend a suspect resulted in the suspect's death. 14 In this case,
149
a police dog killed a hiding felony suspect by seizing his throat.
However, the nighttime burglary suspect was warned at least twice
to emerge from a car dealership, wherein he was hiding, and was
also notified that a police dog would be unleashed if he disobeyed. 5 °
In Robinette, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
"the use of a properly trained police dog to seize a felony suspect
'
does not constitute deadly force." 151
Moreover, the court held that
the facts in
even if use of a police dog could constitute deadly force,
1 2
1
force.
such
justified
have
would
case
particular
this
The court's decision was adduced from the Model Penal
Code's definition of deadly force.153 The definition reads:
[F]orce which the actor uses with the purpose of
causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk
of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely
firing a firearm in the direction of another person or

145
Id.
146 Beers,

supra note 8, at 23.

'47854

F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 910.
'49Id. at 911; see Riding the Circuits Part II, NAT'L. L.J. Feb. 27, 1989, at 35.
IS0The suspect, Daniel Briggs, was eventually found lying face down on the floor
in a darkened bay area of the Superb Motors car dealership in Nashville. Robinette, 854
F.2d at 911. The police dog had the suspect's neck in his mouth. Id. Half of Briggs'
body was situated underneath a car. Id.
11 Id. at 910.
152 Id.
-

"' Id. at 912.

298 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be

constitutes deadly force. 154
From this definition, the court formulated two factors which are
necessary to determine whether a police officer's use of a tool can be
considered deadly force. 5 The first is the police officer's intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm; the second is the probability,
known to the officer, notwithstanding his intent, that the particular
tool when used to affect an arrest creates a substantial risk that death
or serious bodily harm will result. 56
Therefore, because no
evidentiary disclosure suggested that the officer involved intended to
inflict death or serious bodily harm, or that the officer strayed from
acceptable building search procedures with a police dog, the court
157
concluded that no deadly force was employed.
Moreover, the court declared this particular case to be "an
extreme aberration from the outcome intended or expected," based
upon two facts. 158 First, the records of The United States Police
Canine Association corroborated the defendant-officer's testimony
that no trained police dog had ever before killed a suspect upon
apprehension. 159 Second, considering the manner in which the dog
was trained to apprehend suspects, 6 the court believed that there was
only "a remote chance that this particular scenario would occur. "61
Hence, the court of appeals, in affirming the lower court's decision
stated that, "although in this particular case the use of a police dog
to apprehend a suspected felon resulted in that felon's death, deadly
force was not used to seize the felon""'6 because "no substantial risk

'54

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

1S5 Robinette,

854 F.2d at 912.

156Id.

157Id.
158Id.

19 Id. at 913.
160The court noted that, although "the dogs are trained to seize suspects by the arm

and then wait for an officer to secure the arrestee. . . the dog had been trained to seize
whatever part of the anatomy was nearest if an arm wasn't available." Robinette, 854
F.2d at 912.
161Id. at 912.
'62 Id. at 913.
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of causing death or serious bodily harm" was involved.163 Finally,
the court approved of the use of K-9s in the apprehension of
criminals, noting that the dogs can often help prevent officers from
having to use or be the target of deadly force. "
Additionally, the court held that even if a K-9 assisted arrest
comes under the definition of deadly force, such force was not
unreasonable considering the particular circumstances of the case.' 65
The court then analyzed the holding in Tennessee v. Garner.166 The
Supreme Court in Garnerheld that when a suspect is apprehended by
deadly force, the seizure is "subject to the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment. ' 167 The Garner Court elaborated by
stressing that deadly force used in the act of an arrest is not
unreasonable per se under constitutional standards. 61 Instead, the
Court adopted the balancing test articulated in United States v.
Place.169 The Place test weighs "the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion."' 70 Taking the test one step further, the Garner Court
concluded that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

Id. at 912.
Id. at 914.
5 Robinette, 854 F.2d at 913.
'6 Id. at 911-12. In Garner, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee statute
allowing a police officer to use all the necessary means to effect an arrest, after giving
a criminal suspect notice of intent to arrest, to be "unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the use of deadly force against an apparently unarmed, non-dangerous fleeing
suspect." 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1985). The Court also held that deadly force may be used
only if necessary to "prevent [a suspect's] escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others." Id. at 3.
'6' Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 11.
169Id. at 8.
170462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). In Garner,the Court noted, however, "[t]he use of
'6

"4

deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances,
is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they
escape." 471 U.S. at 11.
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officers or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent
escape by using deadly force. "17

Upon applying the balancing test to the set of facts established
in Robinette, the court of appeals concluded that "the circumstances
warranted the use of deadly force. ,1 72 Reiterating the lower court's
finding, the court stated:
[A] reasonably competent officer would believe that
a nighttime burglary suspect, who, the officers had
good reason to believe, knew the building was
surrounded, who had been warned . . . that a dog

would be used, and who gave every indication of
unwillingness to surrender, posed a threat to the
safety of the officers. 173
Consistent with Robinette, though reached by alternative
methods, the decision rendered in Chew v. Gates,174 concluded that
excessive force was not used in a K-9 assisted arrest of a hiding
suspected felon. 75 In Chew, the plaintiff-suspect fled on foot into a
large junkyard after having been stopped for a traffic violation, but
before the police officer could search him for weapons. 176 Chew
brought an action under § 1983 claiming his constitutional rights were
violated when, in the supposed act of arrest, a police dog attacked his
left forearm, causing serious injury. 77
In reaching its decision, the Chew court examined the
Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. O'Connor,78 which pre-dated
Robinette.1 79 Graham explicitly reiterated the Garner analysis in
holding that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest.

171

Id.

'7'

854 F.2d at 913.

73 Id. at 913-14.
174744

F. Supp. 952 (C.D. Cal. 1990).

175Id.
'76 Id.
177 Id.

at 953.

17 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
179 Id.

at 955.

. .

should
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be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness'
standard

. . . .""'

While

acknowledging that the Fourth

Amendment's reasonableness test is incapable of "precise definition
or mechanical application," 18 ' the Court held that:
[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. 182
Consequently, the Chew court applied the Graham criteria,
and concluded that "the use of a police dog to search for, find and
seize Chew, by biting if necessary, was objectively reasonable."' 83
In short, the court's three part analysis went as follows: (1) Chew,
known to be wanted for three outstanding felony warrants was
arrested because of a serious crime; (2) having fled to a large
unknown area before being checked for weapons, he posed an
immediate threat to the officers' safety, and; (3) his fleeing from the
initial officer, compounded with his outstanding felony warrants,
reveal a pattern of evasion. 84 Moreover, his hiding from police for
over two hours constitutes actively resisting arrest.' 85
After this analysis, the Chew court continued by aligning the
earlier Robinette decision with the three prongs of Graham."6 Thus,
Chew points out that Robinette also dealt with a severe
crime-burglary.' 87 Also, because the felon in Robinette knew that
s' Id. at 395; see Brown, supra note 117, at 1270. "[C]ourts that treated the right
to be free from excessive force as a general constitutional right without specifying its
constitutional grounding are unambiguously instructed that the fourth amendment is the
source of the right." Id.
181Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
182 Id.
183 744 F. Supp. at 956.
84

id.

1sId.
186Id.
187 Id.
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the building in which he was hiding was surrounded and he had been
warned that a dog would be used, yet still refused to surrender, he
threatened the, officers' safety and actively resisted arrest." 8 In sum,
both the Robinette and Chew decisions, although two years apart, are
models for the objectively reasonable standard in terms of the use of
a police dog to search for, find and seize a suspect by biting, if
necessary.
However, the case of Luce v. Hayden, 18 9 preceding Graham,
seems inconsistent with the three prong test used in Graham. In
Luce, a state police officer directed a police dog to attack a jail
escapee, even after he had been arrested and handcuffed.1 9 Relying
on precedent, the United States District Court of Maine denied a
motion to dismiss filed by the police officer, citing Rochin v.
California.191 In Rochin, the Supreme Court declared some conduct
to be so offensive as to "shock the conscience" and, therefore, to be
violative of due process.192 The Luce court used several factors to
determine what constitutes a "shock [to] the conscience," thereby
overstepping constitutional bounds.' 93 Among them were: (1) the
need for force; (2) the amount of force used to meet the need; (3) the
severity of the injury; and (4) whether the force was motivated by a
good faith effort to maintain or reestablish discipline or merely for
the purpose of punishment or inflicting injury." 9 The Luce court
concluded that the plaintiff's allegations depict conduct which "indeed
' considering that the officer had already
shocks the conscience," 195
gained full control of the situation, and only ordered the dog's attack

18Chew, 744 F. Supp. at 956.

189598 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Me. 1984).
190 Id.

-9'
Id. at 1103.
'9'342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
'93
598 F. Supp. at 1104.

Id. at 1104 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The Johnson factors are criticized in R. Wilson
Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692 (1987).
Wilson contends that "[c]onsideration of the Johnson factors therefore allows the
decisionmaker to short-circuit the fourth amendment's objective inquiry and bestows
upon officials a potential subjective good faith immunity that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld they do not possess." Id, at 701.
195
598 F. Supp. at 1104.
'"
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to maliciously "frighten and injure" the plaintiff.196 A federal jury
later acquitted the officer. 97
In Marley v. City of Allentown,"' yet another case of a K-9
assisted arrest brought under § 1983, which implicated Fourth
Amendment rights, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the defendant-officer's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, based primarily on Graham.19 9 In
Marley, the plaintiff-suspect, instead of pulling over to the side of the
road when beckoned by a police officer, sped away and ultimately
fled on foot.2"' A police dog, ordered to hunt down the plaintiff,
eventually captured him by biting his right thigh and calf.2"' Citing
Graham and its objectively reasonable test, the court held that "[iun
this case, the plaintiff was, at most, a suspected misdemeanant, not
a suspected felon. Additionally, the officer unleashed the canine
when the unarmed plaintiff was either fleeing or stopping.
Accordingly, one could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff posed
no threat to the officer."202 As a result, the use of the K-9 here
20 3
failed the Graham test.
Athough it is certainly secondary to the human rights issue
involved, the issue of cost with regard to K-9 unit liability suits are
yet another point of concern surrounding the "find and bite" policy." °
For example, in Alexandria, Virginia, a federal jury awarded a
Fairfax City woman $3,000 for severe bites on the thigh and waist.20 5
Similarly, Louis Rendon obtained a $90,000 settlement against the

196 Id.

UPI, Aug. 1, 1986, available in LEXIS, News library, Omni file.
19 774 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
199Id. at 345.
200 Id. at 344.
201 Id.
202 Marley, 774 F. Supp. at 345.
20m Id. at 346.
"7

' In Los Angeles, "[t]he settlement of [all] excessive force lawsuits against the
Sheriff's Department has cost taxpayers $32 million over the last four years." Eric
Malnic, Deputies Use Dogs in IndiscrimanteAttacks, Panel Told; Law Enforcement:
Nearly Two Dozen People Testify in East L.A. on the Sheriff's DepartmentUse of Force,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1992, at B3.
205 Carlyle Murphy, Va. Woman Wins $3,000 in Attack by Police Dog, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1986, at A24.
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Los Angeles Sheriff's Department after being beaten and bitten by a
police dog while he was handcuffed."0 6 In Norfolk, Virginia, a
$6,750,000 suit was filed against city officials in connection with a
police dog attack that inflicted more than twenty-five bites on an
enlisted Navy man.2 °7 In Santa Ana, California, the City Council
settled with a police dog victim for $32,000."' The attack on the
victim, Robert E. Cole, occurred while the police were arresting him
on drunk driving charges. 2 9 Although City Attorney Edward J.
Cooper denied the use of excessive force, he admitted, "we have had
an adverse jury verdict in another similar case, so we decided to
settle. 12 0 Astonishingly, records from the Vancouver, British
Columbia Police Department's legal division reveals that "the city
paid almost as much in one year for dog bite claims as it did in five
years to settle [all] excessive force complaints [against officers]. 211
Specifically, in the first five months of 1992, fourteen dog bite claims
have been filed there.212 Eight of them were settled for an aggregate
total of $16,800.2 1 The settlements ranged from $36 to $8,500.214

' Gregg LaMotte, L.A. P.D. Force Subject of Amnesty InternationalReport (CNN
television broadcast, June 26, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, Omni file.
'07 Dog Attack Leads to Lawsuit, UPI, Sept. 21, 1984, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Omni file. Similarly, in El Paso, Texas, the Fifth Circuit awarded bite victim
Luis Balandran (suspected of breaking into a car and then fleeing from police) $150,000
payable by the arresting officer himself. UPI, Mar. 18, 1988, available in LEXIS,
News library, Omni file. Oscar Lee Dewberry, who was arrested for trespass, filed a
$9,000,000 lawsuit against the Port Authority of New York, after a police attack dog bit
him 18 times. Emily Sachar, Man Bites Back, Sues in Police Dog Attack, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, July 17, 1991.
20 Gebe Martinez, Orange County Focus: Santa Ana; Excessive Force is Settledfor
$32,000, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at B2.
209 Cole was sentenced to one year in prison and three years of probation. Id. The
dog bit him twice on the thigh during the arrest, according to the Santa Ana City
Attorney. Id.
210

Id.

211 Gordon

Hamilton, Canine Claims Costly,

VANCOUVER SUN,

May 15, 1992, at

B7.
212

One of the lawsuits, brought by the son of a University of British Columbia

professor, claimed that due to the lacerations and wrist fractures from the multiple dog
bites, his future as a basketball star was jeopardized. Id. The youth was arrested for
possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. Id. The city's counsel claims
the suit has been withdrawn. Id.
213

Id.
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In comparison, Vancouver paid out only $19,500 in claims brought
against officers in the last five years."'
Ironically, the police dog is supposed to be a "cost-effective
deterrent to crime. "216 Despite the approximate $5,000 price tag for
each two to four year old imported dog, they boast a "very
inexpensive pension plan."217 Additionally, any officer would eagerly
admit he or she would rather lose the money invested in a police dog,
than a fellow officer.21 However, several police departments have
shut down their K-9 programs claiming that the cost outweighed its
worth and effectiveness. 1 9
IV. Qualified Immunity and Discretion
In Marley, the court used the Graham test to deny the
defendant officer qualified immunity.220 Qualified immunity is
routinely granted to a governmental official who performs
discretionary functions upon establishing that his conduct, "[did] not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known. "221 The Marley court
believed that the defendant wrongly relied on Robinette to contend
that he could not have known that using a police dog to stop a fleeing
suspect would overstep constitutional bounds. z2 Furthermore, the
court distinguished Robinette, recognizing that case as one involving
a suspected felon, and thus the officer there had probable cause to
believe the suspect posed a threat. 223 Finally, the Marley court
declared that the officer "should have been aware of the constitutional

214 Hamilton, supra note 211, at B7.
215 Id.

216 O'block et al., supra note 90, at 155.

217 Ferrigno, supra note 92, at Cl; see Pool, supra note 3, at B6.
21" Beers, supra note 8, at 23; see Pool, supra note 3, at B6 ("As much as we love
[the dogs], they're expendable.").
29 O'block et al., supra note 90, at 159.
220744 F. Supp. at 346.
2

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

22

774 F. Supp. at 345-46.

.. Id. at 345.
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constraints enunciated in Garner, and it was not objectively
reasonable for him to think that unleashing a trained attack dog to
apprehend a fleeing misdemeanant comported with those
constraints" 24 and accordingly denied qualified immunity.225
The issue of qualified immunity also appears in Chew, raised
by several defendant-police officers in their attempt to escape
individual liability.22 6 The Chew court observed that there was no
federal statute forbidding the use of police dogs to forcefully
apprehend suspects. 2 7 Moreover, state law did not clearly prohibit
such apprehension.228 The court commented that immunity was
granted by the California Civil Code 229 in cases where a written
Canine Unit Manual existed at the time of the incident.2 3 The court
further noted that such a manual did exist at the time, though its
policy for such apprehensions was limited to the "find and bark"
technique. 31 However, the court concluded that the Code did not
sufficiently require the use of the dog to be consistent with the
manual's regulations. 232 Hence, neither federal nor state law clearly
forbade the training and/or the use of police dogs under the "find,
seize and hold the suspects, by biting if necessary" policy, the
defendants were allowed to use their discretion. 233 Thus, the court
granted qualified immunity as to their individual liability under
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.234
The justification of discretion has often been the smokescreen
behind which police officers' racial prejudices are hidden. In stating
that "the handler has a great deal of discretion out there in calling
those dogs off or staying close with them to make sure that those
dogs are responding responsibly," Karol Heppe of Police Watch, an

224

Id. at 345-46.

22 Id. at 346.
226 744 F. Supp. at 953-54.
227

Id. at 954.

228id.
229 CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3342 (West 1988).

230 Chew, 744 F. Supp. at 954.
231 Id.
232id.
233Id.

24 Id.
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organization that monitors police abuses, maintains that there is
"definitely a racial impact on the use of the dogs. "235 K-9 abuse
against minorities intensified in April, 1963, in Birmingham,
Alabama, as police dogs attacked civil rights demonstrators. 236 At
that time, Birmingham Police Commissioner, Eugene "Bull" Connor
was alleged to have declared to newsmen that, "I want them to see
the dogs work. Look at those niggers run."237 Birmingham presently
uses the "bark and hold" policy and has one of the top K-9 programs
in the United States.238
Today, in Los Angeles, based on LAPD statistics, K-9 bites
occur most often in neighborhoods where the population is mostly
black.2 39 More specifically, reports indicate that in those bite cases

where race has been determined24 more than ninety-seven percent of
the dog bite victims were black or Latino.24 Police dogs were most
frequently summoned to the Seventy-seventh, Southwest, and Newton
divisions, which patrol primarily minority communities. 242 Hwvr
However,

" Police Dogs: Are They Safe?, supra note 4; see Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie, Law
Enforcement and Racial and Ethnic Bias, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 717 (1991). "Police
discretion is, essentially, selective law enforcement, potentially impacted by police
discrimination based on the race, ethnicity, and social class of the victim and alleged
assailant." Id. at 720.
236 Samuel G. Chapman, Police Dogs Versus Crowds, 8 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.,
316, 316 (1980).
237 Id.
238Police Dogs: Are They Safe?, supra note 4.
239 Stolberg, supra note 2, at B1; see Dean E. Murphy, Rights Study Cites Serious
Police Abuse in L.A.; Law Enforcement.- Amnesty InternationalFinds an 'Unchecked'
Pattern of Excessive Force by Officers, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1992, at B1 (suggesting
that African-Americans and Latinos suffer the most from police excesses in Los
Angeles).
240 See Merina, supra note 79, at B1. Such cases constitute only a minority of the
6,400 K-9 searches conducted from 1984 to April, 1990. Id.
24 Id.; see Tim Rutten, Politicians Show Double Standards on Race, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 1992, at El. "Police dogs also appear to have been used to inflict unwarranted
injury on suspects, particularly in black or Latino neighborhoods." Id.
242Merina, supra note 79, at B1.
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whites commit almost twenty-five percent of all burglaries and auto
thefts in the Los Angeles Area.243 Lieutenant Pete Durham of the
LAPD argues that whites are inclined to steal in suburban
neighborhoods, too distant from K-9 units. 2 " According to Bill Lann
Lee, western regional counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, "if you use the dogs the same way in the Anglo
community, there would be tremendous outrage . . . it's a sad and

tragic fact that those dogs are used disproportionately in minority
communities and at the very least should be investigated. "245 In
contrast, Chief Raymon Morris, overseer of the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department's K-9 Unit, claims that it is "not a factor so
much of race as it is a factor of the sort of activities that go on in
certain areas of our community. 1246 In response to the apparent racial
discrepency in the deployment of K-9s in the Los Angeles area, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, along with
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and civil rights
lawyers Cook and Mann, have filed a class action lawsuit charging
the LAPD and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department with having

243Beers,

supra note 8, at 23.

244Id.

245Merina, supra note 79, at B1.
2

Id.
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misused their K-9s through "systematic policies and practices.""
The suit is currently pending.24
V. Conclusion
Without question, the K-9 has emerged as a practical adjunct
to modern day law enforcement. However, the prudence with which
K-9 units are deployed must be strictly monitored to ensure their
liabilities do not outweigh their advantages. Several preventive
measures should be adopted by all municipalities which have a K-9
unit. The measures, aimed at maintaining an acceptable bite-ratio,
would allow K-9 officers to perform their functions unhampered by
any controversy.
The aforementioned reforms adopted by the LAPD and
currently being implemented need to be taken even further. The
"circle and bark" policy should prevail in all municipalities with a K-

On August 18, 1992, the Los Angeles Police
'7 Beers, supra note 8, at 23.
Commission adopted nine policy reforms including the requirement to issue a verbal
warning before the deployment of a police dog, the creation of a special panel to review
serious injuries, the creation of a standardized bite report form and additional clerical
assistance to manage the newly created paperwork. Commission Adopts Interim Report
on use of Police Dogs, Aug. 18, 1992, UPI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Omni
file. Furthermore, the changes make it mandatory for a supervisor to be present at the
scene of any K-9 deployment. Id. The changes also called for improved training for
dogs and handlers alike. Id.; see Leslie Berger, Report Calsfor Changes in LAPD K-9
Unit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at B1 (discussing the Commission Report that
suggests that the Los Angeles police should issue verbal warnings when using dogs,
improve their methods of investigating bites and convene a special panel to review
injuries). However, Paul Hoffman, legal director of the ACLU, was dissatisfied with
the changes. Citizens Unit Urges Los Angeles Police to Curb Use of Dogs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1992, at A14 (stating that although some good recommendations have been
included, Hoffman argues that the key issues still are whether minorities are subject to
a disproportionate amount of K-9 attacks, and whether the K-9s have been allowed to
bite people who pose no threat, has not been addressed).
m However, on September 29, 1992, a report submitted to the Los Angeles Police
Commission stated that by the end of 1992 the K-9 unit would complete retraining of its
16 dogs to comply with the "circle and bark" policy. Michael Connelly, LAPD Begins
Warnings on the Use of Dogs; Police. Policy is Intended to Encourage Surrendersand
Reduce Bites. Animals are Being Retrained to Bark First, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992,
at B3. Captain David J. Gascon, commander of the Metro Division, including the 17
officer K-9 unit, stated, "[w]e are taking this as a top priority." Id.
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9 unit. The police dog should be used predominantly as a tool (to
locate suspects) and should only be allowed to exert force in self
defense or in defense of its handler. Nevertheless, a warning
announcing the presence of the K-9 should always precede its
deployment. The dog handlers should be psychologically tested
before being assigned to the K-9 unit, to insure their mental
preparedness. After a biting incident, the dogs should immediately
undergo a miniature simulation of that exact biting incident, and the
dogs' performance should be reviewed by supervising officers. If the
dog reacts in an identical manner, and the behavior is contrary to the
"circle and bark" policy, the dog should be immediately retrained.
Moreover, periodic retraining should be instituted, regardless of the
number of bites inflicted between retraining periods.
Furthermore, in the event of a bite, the dog handler at the
scene should be required to photograph all bite wounds, and maintain
a bite book; an album depicting the extent of all bite inuries. The
victim should be treated as a shooting victim, for purposes of
investigation, review, and documentation. Treatment and medical
attention should be pursued immediately. With such reforms in
place, it will be hard for any plaintiff to make out a Monell type
claim against the municipality.
Douglas U. Rosenthal

